Exit from the middle-income trap may take years

Almost one year ago I wrote an article about the difficulties that were facing the Turkish economy with regard to increasing per capita income for two years.

In my article titled “Turkey on the brink of middle-income trap," I argued that the high per capita income growth that was led by robust labor productivity growth during the first years of Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule, slowed down first and then totally stopped in 2012, based on a research published by Bahçeşehir University's Center for Economic and Social Research (BETAM) in August 2013.

BETAM published an updated version of this research last Wednesday titled  "Turkey's exit from the middle-income trap may take years" aiming to scrutinize changes in the per capita growth, employment rate and labor productivity that has occurred over one year.

Indeed, from 2002 to 2011, per capita income rose roughly from $3,000 to 10,500. Since then, it has stagnated. This astonishing performance is due to two basic factors: the appreciation of the Turkish lira in real terms against the United States dollar and an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate close to 6 percent, which provided a per capita income increase over 4 percent per year, given the population growth rate. This means an overall per capita income increase of over 40 percent in real terms in nine years.

Furthermore, we know this improvement has profited all segments of society almost equally, with the low-income segments being slightly more favored. For more information, see my recent piece “The growth of the middle class." The strong per capita income increase has allowed a modest decrease in income inequality and a rather remarkable decrease in poverty, which, however, continues to be quite high. The BETAM research focuses on the evolution of the main factors that contributed to this striking per capita income increase at the beginning and its abrupt stop at the end of the research period.

As one of the authors of the report, let me briefly explain the methodology used. It is possible to break down the per capita income increase into three contributors: the ratio of the working age population to the total population; the employment ratio (employment by working-age population); and labor productivity, defined as GDP per employed individual.

The contribution of the working-age population ratio is marginal. Though the working-age population is still growing more rapidly than the total population, this factor shall be extending in the 2020s because of an aging population. As for the two other factors -- namely employment ratios and labor productivity -- three different sub periods have been observed. Until the second quarter of 2008, the entry date of the economy into recession, high per capita income growth was driven largely by increases in labor productivity. During this period, total employment almost stagnated; non-farming employment rose significantly, while agricultural employment declined.

In the aftermath of the global crisis, the nature of per capita income growth changed dramatically. From the last quarter of 2009 to the last quarter of 2011, the economy had very high per capita income growth rates -- over 7 percent. Both increases in the employment ratio and in labor productivity contributed more or less equally to this performance.

However, starting at the beginning of 2012, The increase of per capita income decelerated dramatically along with the slowing GDP growth. BETAM's analysis shows that until the second quarter of 2013, the per capita income increases declined under 1 percent; however, the most striking future of this decline was that the decrease in labor productivity turned out to be negative.
In other words, the weak growth -- GDP growth was limited to 2 percent in 2012 -- was supported only by the increase of employment ratio. During the following three quarters one observes slight improvement in the growth performance; labor productivity resumed to contribute to the per capita income increase that rose to some extent and reached 2 percent. Nevertheless, in the first quarter of this year, the contribution of labor productivity had become negative again.

At the end of the day, we can assert that more than two years of labor productivity has not contributed to the per capita income growth, which continues to be quite low. Strong employment increases certainly have prevented the increase of unemployment, but this low level of per capita income growth will not allow Turkey to escape from the middle-income trap quickly.  

  (this article is published in Todays' Zaman, July 26, 2014)

Geopolitical risks are increasing

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu declared recently that the government will not allow the Middle East to become a swamp that includes the Holy Cave of Hira.

I presume that Mr. Davutoğlu is alluding to critics in the opposition who claim that the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has pushed Turkey into the “Middle East swamp” because of wrong foreign policy decisions which have resulted in the loss of any and all tools that might allow Turkey to play a role of mediation in the conflicts that are shaking the region. In fact, the Middle East is full of holy places, not only for Muslims, but also for Christians and Jews. This might be one of the factors which has kept the region locked in a cycle of violence and intolerance since the old order disappeared, while a new order cannot emerge.

AKP foreign policy might have taken into consideration the highly complex social and political imbroglio of the region more realistically and not put all its eggs in the basket of its “morality” claims. If this morality was not suspect due the double standards of its claimants it might be less questionable, but this is not the case. Regardless, the results of the deadly realities of the Middle East and those of AKP foreign policy remain. So, let's focus on the consequences of this state of affairs on political economy.

The bloodbath perpetrated by the Israeli army in Gaza is certainly a great human tragedy, but this bloodbath has also torpedoed recent hopes of reconciliation between Turkey and Israel. Prime Minister Erdoğan made clear that as long as he is in power there will be no reconciliation with this “terrorist state.” The impotence of Turkey in protecting Gaza civilians from Israeli violence has pushed the prime minister to raise his verbal violence against Israel. The opposition criticizes the prime minister for contenting himself with great bouts of shouting, pushing him to instead take concrete measures such as the suspension of diplomatic and economic relations with Israel.

We are, for sure, in a game of losers for all parties, but the main loser would be the US, which expended enormous effort, including the personal prestige of President Obama, for this reconciliation. This means that Turkey's strategic importance for the US will not always be sufficient to prevent harsh actions against the economic interests of Turkey. For example, the allegation that some state-owned banks in Turkey violated the international embargo against Iran may have serious consequences.

The presence of “Islamic State” (IS) in Syria and northern Iraq seems as though it will last for a very long while. This terrorist organization (or state?) continues to hold Turkish diplomats and their families hostage. These hostages are blocking the Turkish government from instituting coercive policies against IS. Autonomous Kurdish regions in northern Syria are under attack by IS, and the AKP government hesitates to defend them. Turkey's policy against Assad is becoming more and more uncertain.

The AKP does not know how to deal with Bagdad or Arbil. The Kurdish regional government seems like it has decided to progress in its efforts to form an independent state. They have long been allies of Turkey, while Maliki became an adversary. Meanwhile, Israel is encouraging Arbil to declare its independence from Iraq, while Iran and the US oppose it.

What is the strategic stance of Turkey in the face of these issues? I am not sure that AKP leaders have a strategy with clear goals and appropriate tools for the achievement of these goals. The result is that the exports to Iraq which the Turkish economy sorely needs are now declining rapidly, and the hopes put in the increasing oil exports from northern Iraq are in jeopardy because of IS expansion in the region. A decline of exports to Israel is also in sight.

Another important geostrategic threat is the nuclear talks with Iran. The negotiations have not been successful; the deadline has passed. But, as all parties are afraid of the consequences of failure, an additional four months have been given to the talks. Iran is not ready to give up its right of uranium enrichment for civilian use. The 5 + 1 countries (US, Russia, China, France, the UK and Germany) are ready to accept this right if the amount of enriched uranium is limited and if its production is strictly controlled. However, Israel, the main antagonist in the affair, requires the complete abandonment of uranium enrichment and is pushing its Western allies not to compromise. In the meantime, the embargo against Iran is still in place and risks becoming more severe in the near future. This is another serious risk to the Turkish economy.

I have already reached the word limit of my column without being able to treat the Ukrainian crisis, which must be added to the threats from the Middle East via its effects on the Russian economy. At the end of the day, the Turkish economy -- which is already suffering from low growth -- may face further difficulties in the near future. 

Piyasaların iyimserliği

Şu sıralar piyasaların en gözde tartışması Para Poltikası Kurulu’nun (PPK) yarın yapacağı toplantıda faiz indirimine gidip gitmeyeceği, giderse de kaç puan indireceği. Pazartesi akşamı Bloomberg Tv’de Barış Esen’in programına davetliydim. Doğal olarak program faiz tartışmasıyla başladı. Programa katılan Denizbank’ın araştırmacısı Özlem Derici’den piyasaların PPK’nın yüzde 8,75 olan politika faizini 50 baz puan indirmesini beklediğini öğrendim. Barış Esen bana yöneldiğinde genç meslektaşımız Emre Deliveli’nin Hürriyet Daily News’taki son yazısında aktardığı bir anektod ile faiz topuna giriş yaptım.

Emre 2000’lerin ortasında bir finans kuruluşunun araştırmacısı olarak işe başladığında müdürü kendisine “akademik iktisatçı” ile “piyasa iktisatçısı” arasındaki farkı sormuş. Çaylak Emre duraksamış. Müdür farkı gayet yalın bir şekilde açıklamış: Akademik iktisatçı Merkez Bankası’nın ne yapması gerektiğine kafa yorar. Oysa bu bizim müşterilerimizi hiç ilgilendirmez. Onlar merkez Bankası’nın ne yapacağı ile ilgilidirler. Piyasa iktisatçısı da Merkez Bankası’nın ne yapacağı sorusuna yanıt ararar.

Faiz indirimi hata olur

Akademik iktisatçı olarak kendimi bu şekilde güven altına aldıktan sonra Merkez Bankası’nın bu kez faiz indirimine gitmemesi gerektiğini savundum. Bunu söylerken geçtiğimiz dönemde faiz indirimlerini savunduğumu, dolayısıyla faiz tartışmasında şahin kanatta yer almadığımı hatırlatmayı da ihmal etmedim. Piyasaların iyimserliği gösterge faizin (iki yıllık tahvilin faizi) politika faizinin yaklaşık 50 baz puan altında olmasına bağlanıyor. Bir de sanayi istihdamının son dönemde yüzde 1 düşmüş olması ileri sürülüyor. Olabilir. Ama Merkez Bankası’nın işi bu kadar basit olamaz. Son dönemde enflasyonda düşüş beklendiği kadar güçlü olmadı. Enflasyon beklentisinde de hafif artışlar görüldü. Dahası PPK geçen ayki 75 baz puanlık indirimden sonra iç talebin ılımlı seyrettiğini, enflasyonda düşüş belirginleşinceye kadar sıkı duruşun devam edeceğini belirtmişti.

Geçen Cuma Betam’ın yayınladığı son Ekonomik Görünüm notunda büyümenin ihracattaki yavaşlama ve yatırımlardaki durgunluk nedniyle büyümenin ikinci çeyrekte bir miktar zayıfladığı tahmin ediliyor. Ama dengeli büyüme devam ediyor ve cari açık düşüyor. Dahası kredi faizleri de politika faizindeki indirimlere paralel olarak 200 baz puan kadar düştü. Bu düşüşün talebe yansıması için zamana ihtiyaç var. Bunu görmeden PPK’nın yeni bir indirime gitmesi doğru olmaz.

Peki herşeye rağmen bir kez daha politika faizini indirir mi? Bunu yapabilir ama ben şahsen bu adımı siyasal baskı altında alınmış bir karar olarak yorumlarım. Bundan kaçınmak için PPK faiz korudorunu (yüzde 12 ile 8 arası) aşağıya çekebilir ve bunu bahane ederek belki politika faizini de 25 baz puan indirebilir. Bu ara çözüm makul görülebilir. Bakalım ne yapacaklar?

Abdullah Gül opsiyonu

Programda piyasaların orta vadede (piyasaların orta vadesi bir kaç ay oluyor) çok daha iyimser bir senaryoyu satın almakta olduğunu da öğrendim. Piyasalar Tayyip Erdoğan’ın birinci turda iyi bir oyla seçilmesini ardın da Abdullah Gül’ün AKP’nin başına geçmesini ve Babacan’ın ekonomi ekibi ile yola devam edilmesini bekliyormuş. Bu beklentide ciddi bir tutarsızlık gördüğümü söyledim. Eğer Erdoğan birinci turda nispeten yüksek bir oyla seçilirse yeni hükümette Babacan ekibine yer vermeyeceğini ve kendi ekonomik görüşleri ile uyumlu bir ekibin ekonominin başına geçeceğini düşünüyorum.

Benim iyimser senaryom farklı. Erdoğan’a destek birinci turda düşük kalırsa, AKP içindeki huzursuzluk artarken genel seçim endişesi tavan yapacaktır. Bu koşullarda AKP milletvekilleri genel seçimlere güçlü bir lider ile gitmek isterler. Abdullah Gül opsiyonu ancak bu koşullarda gündeme gelir. Erdoğan ikinci turda cumhurbaşkanı seçilirse hangi opsiyonu tercih eder bilemem. Yayın sırasında Gül’ü TOBB’da yaptığı konuşmada canlı olarak izledik. Ekonomi konusunda gayet mantıklı konuştu ve büyük alkış aldı. Bir kenara not edelim.

No economic revival in sight

Economic growth and performance has become a critical issue in Turkish politics. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) candidate for the presidency, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, believes firmly in his victory on Aug. 10. 

Nonetheless, he is worried about the outcome of the next general elections, which are to be held at the latest by June 2015. Mr. Erdoğan knows that the so-called “de facto presidential regime” he defends will be very problematic, not only with respect to the constitutional and legal setting that gives executive responsibility to the prime minister but also politically, since the prime minister who will emerge out of the general elections risks not sharing his priorities with the president of the republic. At the end of the day, the new prime minister will also be seen as an election winning leader.

So, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, even if he becomes president of the republic, is seeking a referendum majority (more than 330 seats) in the next general elections in order to make a new constitution, into which a presidential regime “a la Turca” will be incorporated. In the last general elections in June 2011 the AKP fell four seats short of the referendum majority, despite getting 49.8 percent of the vote. Having at least six or seven seats more requires a 51 percent share of the vote, at least. In the March 30 local elections AKP support by the electorate, although quite controversial, was well below this critical threshold -- around 45 percent at best.

The only way for the AKP to increase its support amongst the electorate is a booming economy. However, the Turkish economy is not going as well as Mr. Erdoğan wants. He is very keen on the economic growth performance. The government's Medium-Term Program forecasts a 4 percent growth for the gross domestic product (GDP), but Mr. Erdoğan definitely wants more. In the year's first quarter, growth reached 4.3 percent. This achievement, I believe, saved an open clash between the prime minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan for the time being. However, the recent forecasts for the second quarter and the remainder of the year are not very bright.

Bahçeşehir University's Center for Economic and Social Research (BETAM) revised its yearly growth forecast for the second quarter from 3.8 percent to 3.4 percent in its last economic forecast, published on Friday. Indeed, the leading indicators, such investments, exports, industrial capacity utilization and consumer confidence, indicate a deceleration in the growth rate from the first quarter to the second. The Industrial Production Index stagnated compared to the first quarter and exports decreased, mainly due to a slowdown in the European economy. In fact, the so-called “balanced growth” is well under way since the current account deficit continues to narrow. BETAM forecasts an improvement of 0.6 percentage points in the current account deficit-to-GDP ratio, down to 5.8 percent from 6.4 percent. Regarding yearly performance, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary fund (IMF) and the World Bank all recently revised their unrealistically low growth forecasts upward, but even so they remained around 3.5 percent.

A positive and balanced but rather low economic growth is certainly good news for Babacan, but not for Erdoğan. He does not care about “balanced growth.” The level of growth is more crucial than its sustainability in the medium term. He knows that with a growth rate of under 4 percent he can claim neither decreasing unemployment nor an improvement in the welfare of the populous segments of society. He also knows that low growth means low tax revenue, and low tax revenue means limited public resources for spending on infrastructure.

Moreover, Mr. Erdoğan firmly believes that it is possible to revive the economy by making sizable cuts in interest rates without jeopardizing either the stability of the exchange rate or making efforts to decrease inflation, still running around 9 percent.

In this context the Thursday meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has become very critical. Since April, the Turkish Central Bank decreased its policy interest rate by 175 basis points to 8.75 percent from 10 percent in two steps. In line with this decrease, bank loans' interest rates decreased also, by 200 basis points roughly. But this ease in financial conditions did not have a noticeable effect on domestic demand, at least not yet. So, Mr. Erdoğan does not ease up on his pressure on the central bank managers. However, I do not think any further room actually remains for an interest rate decrease. If the option of a limited one is decided by the PPK next Thursday, this decision will be perceived as a sign of weakness in business circles. If the MPC decides to keep its policy rate unchanged, it must be ready to face the fury of Mr. Erdoğan once again. 

(This article is published in Todays' Zaman, July 15, 2014)

Two faces of Diyarbakır

This will be my last piece on Diyarbakır. I have already discussed the politics and socio-cultural aspects of Turkey's Kurdistan. Now, it is time to look its economics.

Before arriving in Diyarbakır I already had a statistical understanding its high level

Diyarbakır suriçi

Diyarbakır Kayapınar

of poverty relative to Turkey. As such, I was ready to face the traditional images of poverty in its streets. I was not incorrect in my expectation. Begging is more widespread there than that which we are accustomed to in Istanbul. The number of children roaming along the large city walls of Diyarbakır is striking. On the sidewalk, a line of street sellers hawks all sort of goods, from cigarettes to cheap perfumes.

When I returned to Istanbul I checked the figures. They confirm what was quite obvious in the streets. In 2013, the unemployment rate in Diyarbakır province (including Şanlıurfa) was 17.5 percent, while the average rate for Turkey was 9.7 percent. The gap was even wider in the case of the non-agricultural unemployment rate: almost 24 percent versus 12 percent.

I am curious to know the figures related to the number of vendors. In urban areas, the proportion of vendors -- called “mobile or irregular workers” by the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) -- in terms of total employment is 6 percent nationwide, while it is 12.7 percent in Diyarbakır. Last but not least, the rate of informal urban employment is a shocking 47.6 percent in the province while it is around 22.9 percent nationwide. In sum, precarious levels of unemployment and informal employment are already serious issues in Turkey, but the problems are two-fold in Diyarbakır.
If it hadn't been for one of our hosts, Muhammed Akar, I would have left having only seen the dark sides of life in Diyarbakır. Akar -- a lawyer in the Diyarbakır Bar Association and president of Diyarbakır's Justice and Development Party (AKP) Municipal Council -- took us to explore outside the walls of the old city. He especially wanted to show us the town of Kayapınar, just outside of the Diyarbakır. Kayapınar has grown from 3,000 to 300,000 inhabitants in just the last decade. Hundreds of modern buildings line big avenues where shoppers wander in and out of large malls. Though it was the first day of Ramadan, young people -- boys and girls -- packed the terraces of many Nişantaşı-style cafes, sipping their lemonades. Kayapınar reveals how Diyarbakır, unlike many other Anatolian provinces, is definitely a secular place.

I asked Akar what kind of people lived in Kayapınar. “The new middle class,” he answered, adding that the housing boom is now also producing “smart buildings” with added technological features. For sure, the impressive per capita income growth of the 2002-2011 period did not miss Diyarbakır [see my piece, “The growth of the Middle Class”].

However, worries about the future are not lacking. Ahmet Sayar, the new president of Diyarbakır's Chamber of Industry and Commerce, complains that large investment incentives granted to the least developed regions three years ago have disappointed in terms of their results. Investors are hesitating because they aren't sure they will see definitive and lasting peace in the region.
According to president Sayar, in the last few years, many investors from Western Turkey and abroad have made serious investment plans in the region, plans they have not committed to yet. Apart from actual political uncertainties, the lack of skilled workers is another obstacle for investors. In order to fulfill this need for skills, the chamber started construction three months ago on a technical school with a capacity of 1,500 students.

Sayar is very confident about the future if the current peace negotiations between the AKP Government and the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) end in a stable and long-lasting solution. He also informed us that when construction is completed on the Tigris' Silvan dam, it will be possible to irrigate 70 percent of the cultivable land in Diyarbakır province. President Sayar believes that, at that time, the land productivity will be tripled.

Let's hope for peace and for Diyarbakır!

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu iyi gidiyor

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu

Geçen haftaki yazımı “belirttiğim üç koşul itibariyle ve eksik bilgiler ışığında şimdilik Erdoğan’ın cumhurbaşkanı olma ihtimalinin çok yüksek olduğunu” söyleyerek noktalamıştım. Oysa, son bir hafta içinde yaptığım gözlemler umut verici gelişmeler olduğunu gösteriyor. Geçen hafta fazla kötümser bir ruh hali içinde olduğumu fark ediyorum.

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu seçim kampanyasını doğru strateji üzerine bina etmeye başladı. Seçmen esas olarak sistem tercihi yapacak: Türkiye, demokrasi, güçler arası denge ve yönetim etkinliği açısından en iyi hangi sistem ile yönetilir? Parlamenter sistem ile mi, yoksa başkanlık / yarı başkanlık sistemi ile mi? Seçim kampanyası sıradan seçmenin anlayabileceği şekilde bu sorunun oluşturduğu zemine oturtulabilirse, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu’nun şansı artacaktır.

AKP seçmenine mesaj

Aydın’da vatandaşlarla yaptığı sohbette İhsanoğlu’nun dile getirdiği görüşler bu stratejinin iyi bir örneği. “Başbakan’ın görevlerini de uygulayacağım derseniz kriz yaşanır...Rolleri değiştirmek veya birleştirmek olamaz, bu çok tehlikeli bir yolucluk olur” dedikten sonra şu kritik saptamayı yapıyor İhsanoğlu: “Siz istediğiniz partiye oy veriniz, bu sizin hakkınız...parti tercihinizi bir yana bırakacaksınız, onu gelecek yıl kullanırsınız. Bu benim devletimin başkanı olsun diyeceksiniz.”

Ortak aday tartışması başlayalı beri ısrarla Başbakan’ın “fiili başkanlık” zorlaması Türkiye’yi siyasal ve ekonomik istkrarsızlığa sürükleyecek yolun başlangıcı olacaktır tezini savundum. Bunu istemiyorsak, diğer ifade ile Recep tayyip Erdoğan’ın cumhurbaşkanı olmasını istemiyor otoriterleşmeye dur diyecek bir cumhurbaşkanı istiyorsak ortak adayın şart olduğunu, ama bunun yetmeyeceğini, ortak adayın seçimi kazanabilmesi için bağımsız AKP seçmeninden de oy almasının şart olduğunu belirttim. Bunun için Erdoğan’ın karşısına çıkacak adayın, cumhurbaşkanı seçiminin bir genel seçim olmadığını, bu seçimle iktidarın değişmeyeceğini, parlamento çoğunluğunun tayin ettiği hükümete saygılı olacağını, buna karşılık cumhurbaşkanının anayasanın kendisine verdiği yetkiler çerçevesinde demokrasinin, özgürlüklerin ve kuvvetler ayrılığının bekçisi olacağını ısrarla vurglumasanın gerektiğini her fırsatta ifade ettim.

İhsanoğlu bu kritik noktayı iyi kavramış görünüyor. İhsanoğlu’nun yukarıda alıntıladığım görüşleri doğru zemine oturuyor. AKP’nin bağımsız seçmenlerine yönelik bu mesajı bıkmadan usanmadan tekrarlaması gerekiyor.

CHP tabanında tepki sönüyor

Ancak İhsanoğlu’nun seçimi kazanması için bu yaklaşım yeterli olmayabilir. İkinci bir koşul CHP seçmeninin büyük çoğunluğunun kendisini desteklemesi gerekiyor. Bu konuda da İhsanoğlu’nun giderek daha ikna edici olduğunu görüyorum. Gerek yakın çevremde gerek günlük yaşamda karşılaştığım sıradan CHP’li seçmen kararlılıkla İhsanoğlu’nu destekliyor. Bu gözlemelerin elbette istatistiki bir değeri yok. Bununla birlikte CHP tabanında İhsanoğlu’nun ortak aday olarak açıklandığı ilk günlerdeki olmusuz havanın dağılmakta olduğu aşikar. Eğer İhsanoğlu AKP seçmeninden belli ölçüde destek görür,CHP seçmeni de sandığa giderse seçimin ikinci tura kalacağı kesin gibi gözüküyor.

HDP’nin anahtar rolü

Bu durumda seçimin anahtarını birinci turda HDP adayı Selahattin Demirtaş’a oy verecek seçmenler oluşturacak. Diyarbakır’da yaptığım temaslar, HDP’nin ikinci turda sandığı boykot etme çağrısı yapmasının ya da seçmenlerini serbest bırkamasının çok yüksek olasılık olduğunu göstermişti. Boykot seçeneği tercih edilirse, ki bunu engellemek için AKP asgari ölçülerde de olsa müzakerelerin içini doldurma telaşı içinde, İhsanoğlu’nun birinci turda ipi önde göğüslemesi gerekiyor. Bu başarılabilirse HDP boykotu İhsanoğlu’nu Köşk’e çıkartır.

 Buna karşılık HDP seçmenini serbet bırakırsa, ki bu seçenek HDP-BDP-PKK açısından barış sürecinin yolunda ilerlediğinin kabulü anlamına gelir, Erdoğan’ın seçimi kazanma ihtimali çok büyük ölçüde artar. HDP-BDP-PKK cenahı zor bir seçimle karşıkarşıya: Tek adam rejimine doğru ilerleyen Tayyip Erdoğan’ın cumhurbaşkanı olmasını gerçekten istiyorlar mı?

Turkey's Kurdistan: a multicultural society

I have already spoken about the variety of political streams in what the Kurdish citizens of Diyarbakır (Amed) like to call -- without any ulterior motive -- “Turkey's Kurdistan” or “Northern Kurdistan.” It is just a natural name inherited by history. However, the land of Kurdistan is not inhabited only by Kurds. The ethnic and cultural tissue of this land is even more varied than its political structure. “Kurds” and “Kurdish” are appellations that are too general.

A living picture of this multiculturalism appeared when we met some members of the Council of Forty (Kırklar Meclisi) in the courtyard of the Surp Giragos Church, the biggest Armenian church in the Middle East, recently restored at the initiative of Sur Mayor Abdullah Demirbaş. The Council of Forty, organized by Demirbaş, brings 46 members representing various communities in rural Diyarbakır together regularly. Around the table are leaders from the Nakshibendi, Armenian, Syriac, Nur, Keldani, Turkmen Alevi and Domani (Roms of Kurdistan) communities. I must confess that I was not only impressed by this plurality but also became aware of my ignorance in the course of the discussions we had.

I learned, for example, that Zazas who define themselves as Kurds but speak a very different language from Kurdish Kurmanchi are not exclusively Alevis living in Dersim; but some of them are Sunnis living in neighboring provinces and Şeyh Said, the leader of a Kurdish uprising in 1925, was a Zaza. I also learned that there are dozens of Turkmen Alevi villages in Diyarbakır and that there are still four Jewish households in Diyarbakır. They prefer not to reveal their identity, which explains, according to Demirbaş, why a synagogue is lacking on his “Street of Cultures,” where a historical mosque, the Surp Giragos Church, the Keldani Catholic Church and an Alevi house of worship all welcome their own believers side by side. Unlike Jews, every day more people are revealing their Armenian identity. Ergün Ayık, the president of the Diyarbakır Surp Giragos Armenian Church Foundation, told us that in the recent past there were only eight Armenians in Diyarbakır, but now he counts more than 100. Şehmuz Diken, the author of “Gittiler İşte” (They Have Left), a story of Diyarbakır's Armenians, added that hundreds of thousands of descendants of the Armenians who survived the genocide remain in the region and have started to reveal their multiple identities.

After the roundtable we visited the Keldani Catholic Church, also recently restored, which dates back to the fifth century. Yusuf Karadayı, the leader of the Keldani community, gave us an archive document describing the Ottoman census done in 1869. According to the document, in addition to 10,000 Muslims, roughly 8,000 Armenians, 1,500 Syriacs, 1,000 Keldani, 300 Greeks and 300 Jews were living in Diyarbakır. One thinks about how not just Diyarbakır but Turkey might have been different if the tragedies during the building of the nation-state had not occurred.

Demirbaş, tireless defender of multiculturalism, was elected mayor in 2004 with more than 50 percent of the vote, but he was removed from office and jailed in 2007 because he decided to provide local services in six languages. He was re-elected in 2009 with over 60 percent of the vote. Diyarbakır liked and embraced the cultural tolerance. The Sur Municipality erected a monument in the name of the victims of ethnic cleansings. On the monument one can read, “We experienced the pain so that it is not suffered again,” in Kurdish, Turkish, English, Armenian, Hebrew and Pontus Greek. So, it is not so surprising to learn that a demonstration organized by LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual) individuals was recently held in Diyarbakır but it was not possible to hold such demonstration in Bursa.

Before finishing this piece, let me remark that multiculturalism presents a great challenge to offering an education in the mother tongue. Indeed, Kurmanchi, the most used language in the region, may not be the only new language in the future. Education in other mother tongues should also be considered. As I noted in my last column, learning Turkish perfectly is a must in order to prevent inequality of opportunity; a double language education system should be envisaged. The approach of the recently established Selahaddin Eyubi University regarding this issue is worthy of note. They decided to make Turkish the main language of education but to also push the students to learn English through intensive courses given by instructors who are native speakers as well as to encourage all students to learn Kurmanchi. However, Kurmanchi will be obligatory for students in the university's medical faculty. And last but not least, the students in the commerce department have to learn Syriac! 

(This article is published in Today's Zaman, July 8)

Surp Grigor Church before and after restoration

Kurdish movement at crossroads

In my previous piece on Tuesday (“Looking at Kurdish issue from Diyarbakır”), I promised to discuss the medium and long-term perspectives on the Kurdish problem more comprehensively.

One of the hot debates we had with our interlocutors in Diyarbakır was, indeed, the complex interferences between the fight for democracy in Turkey -- which means, ceteris paribus, the fight against the authoritarian drift of Mr. Erdoğan -- and the Kurdish movement's fight for political and cultural rights. The dilemma of the Kurdish movement lies within the definition of priorities: Do Kurdish political organizations, particularly those close to PKK -- which is an active actor in the settlement process along with its leader Öcalan -- give priority to the fight against authoritarianism or to the attainment of individual and collective rights? Since fighting authoritarianism means simultaneously fighting Erdoğan, his ambitions for a presidential regime and his control over the media and the judiciary, how can they, at the same time, get their rights through negotiations conducted with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its uncontestable leader, Tayyip Erdoğan?

There is no easy answer to this question. When we asked this question to Seyit Fırat, a prominent member of the permanent delegation of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) -- a kind of de facto parliament consisting of representatives of civil society associations and institutions close to the PKK --he answered that authoritarian measures damage the Kurdish movement and historical experience shows that anti-democracy always finds the Kurds at the end of the day.

He added that their preference is clearly for the parliamentary regime. For proof, it is enough look at the proposals made by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) for the new constitution in the National Assembly. I would like to note that I personally think that the BDP approach to the new constitution has been the most democratic of all. Other interlocutors like Tahir Elçi, the new president of the Diyarbakır bar, or Şeyda Bucak, the president of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) confirm this approach. We frequently heard that “the Kurdish problem cannot be solved without democracy in Turkey and Turkey cannot be democratic without solving the Kurdish problem.”

Finally, various components of the Kurdish movement are ready to fight for democracy and to oppose the presidential regime, but at the same time they do not conceal the fact that they do not see a reliable alternative to AKP rule. All they can hope for at the moment is an evolution of the People's Republican Party (CHP) toward a true, social-democrat party. “The CHP must change,” said Seyit Fırat unambiguously.

The second hot debate we had was, obviously, over one of the main parameters of the solution to the Kurdish problem in the medium and long terms. I had already noted in my previous column that all groups within the Kurdish Movement ask for the right to education in their mother tongue. This demand became, in a sense, the red line for Kurds, including the AKP supporters among them. When I remarked that young Kurds also have to speak Turkish perfectly in order to prevent inequalities in opportunities, my interlocutors agreed. I think the implementation of a double language system is unavoidable in the near future and the CHP has to adapte to this idea as soon as possible.

The other critical issue regarding the solution is, of course, the institutional set-up for collective rights. The emergence of the Kurdish Rojava province in northern Syria as an autonomous region and the recent events in Iraq that brought the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) very close to their independence radically changed the parameters of the long-run solution. Regarding this point, I have already written that the BDP-PKK became, in a way, more moderate than the other Kurdish parties, which, from left to right, all ask for a federal solution while the former are ready to be satisfied with regional autonomy. Şertaç Bucak, the president of the Turkish KDP, underlined that without federalism Kurds would be condemned to the status of a simple minority. I must also note that some of my interlocutors close to the PKK line did not conceal the fact that they do not support an independent Kurdish state in south Kurdistan.

However, when I tried to learn what the final solution would look like if an independent Kurdish state were founded by Barzani and, if a similar evolution were to occur in Rojava how these events would influence the Kurdish problem of Turkey, all the interlocutors, including AKP supporters, think that deep economic integration with Turkey accompanied by loose political integration -- say, a kind of confederation -- would be the best solution for Kurds as well as for Turks.

Paradoxically, the PKK line asks for a “minimal program” while other leftist, conservative or Islamic movements ask for a “maximal program.” During our meeting with the permanent members of the DTK we were told that the recent legal framework announced by the AKP government is a very positive step but that the content is empty. It must fulfill three major, basic measures: general amnesty (including amnesty for Öcalan), the right to education in the mother tongue and regional autonomy. I have to underline that this regional autonomy would not exclusively be for “Northern Kurdistan” but rather a devolution embracing the entire country.

Cumhurbaşkanı seçimi

Nihayet cumhurbaşkanı seçiminin adayları kesinleşti. Sürpriz yok. Gerek bu köşede gerek katıldığım televizyon programlarında Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu’nun üç koşula bağlı olarak kazanabileceğini savunageldim; 1) 10 Ağustos’ta CHP seçmeninin fazla fire vermeden sandığa gitmesi, 2) İhsanoğlu’nun Başbakan’ın ekonomi anlayışından ve dış politikasından tedirgin olan bağımsız AKP seçmeninin bir bölümünden oy alması, 3) İkinci turda HDP seçmeninin az da olsa bir bölümünden destek görmesi.

            CHP’nin ulusalcı kesimi İhsanoğlu’nun adaylığına imza vermeyerek tavrını netleştirdi. Belli ki açıktan olmasa bile alttan alta İhsanoğlu’na oy verilmemesi için çalışacaklar. İhsanoğlu ne radar az oy alırsa, dolayısyla Erdoğan ne kadar çok oy alırsa, muhtemel bir olağanüstü kurultayda Kılıçdaroğlu’nu devirme şanslarının o kadar yüksek olacağını düşünüyorlar. Bu elbette dar görüşlü siyasetten başka bir şey değil ama CHP’de işler ne yazık ki böyle yürüyor. Buna karşılık, CHP’nin sol kesim seçmeninin önemli bir bölümü ilk turda HDP’nin adayı Selahattin Demirtaş’a oy verebilir. Şimdilik CHP seçmeninin ne kadarının seçimi boykot edeceğini ne kadarının HDP adayına yöneleceğini kestirmek zor. CHP’li dostlarım İhsanoğlu Erdoğan’ın seçilmesinin Türkiye’yi hangi badirelere sürükleyeceğini iyi anlatabilirse, firenin minimize olacağını söylüyorlar. Umarım haklı çıkarlar.

            Öte yandan İhsanoğlu’nun AKP’nin tedirgin seçmenlerinden ne ölçüde oy alabileceğine dair herhangi bir anket sonucu ya da emare göremiyorum. Seçim kampanyası belli bir kıvama geldikten sonra yapılacak güvenilir seçim araştırmalarını beklemek gerekiyor. Buna karşılık 30 Martta MHP’ye oy veren 2 milyon kadar eski AKP’li seçmenin  bir bölümünün Erdoğan’a oy vermesi olası. Ne kadarının oy verebileceğini de kestirmek zor.

Diyarbakır’dan bakınca

            Geçen hafta sonu dostum Şahin Alpay ile Diyarbakır’daydık. Hemen hemen tüm görüşten siyasal parti ve sivil toplum kuruluşları temsilcileri ile görüşmeler yaptık. Kürdistan coğrafyasının siyasal, toplumsal ve kültürel açıdan ne  kadar karmaşık ve çoğulcu bir gerçekliğe sahip olduğunu görmek hem şaşırtıcı hem de sevindiriciydi. Diyarbakır izlenimlerimi ve yorumlarımı gelecek yazılarda paylaşmak istiyorum.

            Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimine gelince...Hangi görüşten olursa olsun Kürt seçmenler İhsanoğlu’na sıcak bakmıyor. Halepçe katliamı konusunda, genel olarak Kürt sorunu konusunda tek söz etmemiş olmasını kınıyorlar. İhsanoğlu’nu Türk devletinin seçkin bir temsilcisi olarak algılıyorlar ve daha ziyade MHP’nin adayı gibi görüyorlar. Kaldı ki CHP’nin İhsanoğlu’na verdiği destek de Kürtleri ikna etmekten hayli uzak. Kılıçdaroğlu’nun kısa süre önce gerçekleştirdiği Diyarbakır toplantısı düş kırıklığı yaratmış. Özellikle anadilde eğitim talebine Kılıçdaroğlu’nun bu konuyu pedagoglarla görüşmek lazım şeklindeki tepkisine çok içerlemişler. Bölgede iyice yaygın hale gelen ifadeyle Kuzey Kürdistanda anadilde eğitim hakkı, AKP’liler dahil çok geniş bir taban tarafından çözümün “olmazsa olmaz” koşulu olarak görülüyor

Dahası, Türkiye genelinde AKP’li Kürt seçmenlere ilk turda Selahattin Demirtaş’a oy vermeleri çağrıları yapıldığını öğrendim. Selahattin Demirtaş’ın HDP’nin yüzde 6,5 çekirdek oyundan daha fazla oy alacağı anlaşılıyor. İkinci turda ise HDP ya boykot çağrısı yapacak ya da kseçmeni serbest bırakacak. Bu iki seçenekten hangisini tercih edeceği Erdoğan’ın Kürt hareketinin temel taleplerine ne karşılık vereceğine bağlı.

Yazımın başında belirtiğim üç koşul itibariyle ve eksik bilgiler ışığında şimdilik söylenebilecek olan Erdoğan’ın cumhurbaşkanı olma ihtimalinin çok yüksek olduğu. Eğer CHP fazla fire verirse seçim birinci turda da bitebilir.   

Looking at the Kurdish issue from Diyarbakır

Last weekend I was in Diyarbakır with my friend and colleague Şahin Alpay. We were invited by Muhammed Akar, the president of the Olive Branch Peace Platform, a civil society association that encourages a pluralistic view, and by Selahaddin Eyyubi University, a recently established private foundation university. We met with representatives from almost all the political movements as well as with the civil society groups working on the Kurdish issue during our two days there. I must confess that I became aware of the fact that the political, social and cultural realties of the region are much more complicated than the simplistic view of considering the Kurdish issue essentially a settlement process between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), or between Kurds and Turks. I will try to describe this complex reality and share my personal comments in the next few columns.

Let's start today with the current hot issue: the election of the president of the republic. It is no secret that I support Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the joint candidate of the opposition. So, I was very curious to know how his candidacy is perceived in Diyarbakır. Well, the answer is, not very well. All my Kurdish interlocutors said they will not vote for Mr. İhsanoğlu, even in a second round.  I have been told that İhsanoğlu can only get the votes of Turkmen Alevi in the region. They particularly reproach İhsanoğlu for not condemning the Halepçe massacre while he was secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). He is perceived as an elite representative of the Turkish state and, moreover, as the candidate of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) rather than of the Republican People's Party (CHP).

On the other hand, the candidate of Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), most likely to be Selahattin Demirtaş, has broad support; it is not limited to PKK sympathizers. Nonstop effort is being made to convince independent AKP voters to support the HDP candidate in the first round. The aim is obvious: to show Erdoğan the strength of the Kurdish cause and push him to take the demands of the Kurdish movement, like a general amnesty, education in the mother tongue and collective rights, more seriously. Preventing the election of Erdoğan in first round is the basic strategy in the region. I asked Abdullah Demirbaş, the previous mayor of Diyarbakır's Sur district, what the vote share of the HDP candidate might be and what voting behavior in the second round might look like. He answered that he does not expect more than 9 percent on Aug. 10 and that the HDP will either ask for a boycott of the ballot boxes or tell its electors they're free to vote how they wish in the second round. In these circumstances, I think that even If Mr. Erdoğan does not succeed in being elected in the first round, he will in the second.

As for the settlement process, one can see significant support for the cease-fire status. We have been told that in the last few months a regional power put great pressure on the PKK to break the cease-fire, but thanks to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's determination, a return to armed violence has been avoided. That said, beyond a non-fighting status, the way to reach a final solution to the Kurdish problem is far from clear. I was surprised to see how the goals and strategies differ according to various pro-Kurdish movements. Paradoxically, the PKK line asks for a “minimal program,” while other leftist, conservative or Islamic movements ask for a “maximal program.” During our meeting with the permanent members of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), a kind of de facto parliament consisting of representatives of civil society associations and institutions close to the PKK, we were told that the recent legal framework announced by the AKP government is a very positive step but that the content is empty. It must fulfill three major basic measures: general amnesty -- including Öcalan -- the right to an education in the mother tongue and regional autonomy. I have to underline that this regional autonomy is not to be exclusively for “Northern Kurdistan” but a devolution embracing the entire country.

The right to an education in the mother tongue has become a red line for all Kurdish movements. Aside from this common demand, however, there are quite different views about the organization of collective rights and the institutional set up it requires. The Rights and Freedoms Party (Hak-Par), representing a coalition of old Kurdish socialist and democratic movements, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), representing the historical conservative pro-Kurdish movement and which is close to Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani's KDP, as well as some representatives of İslamist associations ask for a federal solution.

Saturday I will discuss the debate on suggested solutions for the medium and long term more comprehensively.